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Brazil´s Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) note, presented in 2011, 
put the South American nation under the international spotlight as it 
tackled a crucial ongoing debate inside the UN system. Launched in the 
prime of recent Brazilian foreign policy, at the end of its stage at the UN 
Security Council as a non-permanent member, with a sustained history 
of commitment to international peace keeping operations and with 
prospects of becoming an important global player in the international 
arena, the note grasped the attention of policy makers, academia and 
civil society practitioners. But, after 2012, it was followed with silence 
from Brazil, and no further development was made on what many 
analysts and decision-makers considered a conceptual advancement 
in the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) debate from the Global South.
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 Many reasons are attributed to Brazil´s lack of follow up engagement 
of the initiative. RwP stirred the global debate on RtoP and contribu-
ted to foster reactions on the issue by both Western powers and other 
Global South emerging powers. However, the RwP initiative events 
quickly went from being the focus of attention to falling gradually 
into oblivion. While valuable contributions were made with RwP, the 
opportunity to position Brazil as a global rule innovator or norm en-
trepreneur vanished, not only because of the rejection of the Western 
powers or the different priorities and interests  of some of the mayor 
players from the Global South, but because the initiative was dropped 
by the ones who started it.
This chapter is aimed at explaining RwP, its contributions, its criticisms 
and how in the end it was a lost opportunity to promote norms from 
the Global South in the international debate. It also questions Brazil´s 
role as a reliable norm entrepreneur or rule innovator, and whether 
this country can actually become a global player within the emerging 
international system or if it is limited by the shortcomings of its own 
foreign policy exertion tools.
From Responsibility to Protect to Responsibility while 
Protecting (RwP)
In November 2011, in the context of a failed international interven-
tion in Libya based on a resolution inspired by RtoP language, Brazil 
launched its Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) note. Seen by 
specialists as Brazil’s first serious effort at norm entrepreneurship on 
a major issue within the United Nations system, it was in part a res-
ponse to Resolution 1973 that led to military operations (Operation 
Unified Protector) in Libya. Recent events in this country, especially 
the actions of the United Kingdom, the United States and France (the 
P-3), that went beyond the RtoP mandate outlined in Resolution 1973 
and led to a regime change operation in Libya provided the context 
for Brazilian contestation on the issue of international intervention 
and the use of force under UN mandate. As Gareth Evans points out:
“…perception by a large number of countries—led by the 
so-called “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
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Africa)—that the major Western powers, as the NATO-led in-
tervention in Libya went on, overreached the civilian protection 
mandate they had been given by the Security Council by deman-
ding, and achieving, nothing less than the complete destruction 
of the Gaddafi regime” (Evans, 2014: 19-20).
Briefly introducing the concept and the perceptions behind it, then 
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Antonio Patriota, 
wrote in an article for the Brazilian newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo, 
in anticipation of the note on RwP presented later at the UN,  that: 
“…for Brazil, it is fundamental that when exerting the Responsi-
bility to Protect through the use of the military, the international 
community must not only hold the corresponding multilateral 
mandate, but also observe another precept: The Responsibility 
while Protecting. The use of force must only be contemplated as 
a last resort. (…) Burning phases and precipitating the recourse 
of coercion is an attempt against the “rationale” of international 
law and the UN Charter. If our greater objectives included the 
decisive defense of human rights in their universality and indivi-
sibility, as consecrated in the 1993 Vienna Conference, Brazilian 
actions must be defined case by case, under rigorous analysis of 
the circumstances and the means that are most effective to deal 
with each specific situation” (Patriota, 2011).
Later that month, on September 21st 2011, President Dilma Rousseff 
stated during the 66th General Assembly in the United Nations, what 
would be the formal international presentation of the Responsibility 
while Protecting: 
“We vehemently repudiate the brutal repression of civilian po-
pulations. Yet we remain convinced that for the international 
community, the use of force must always be a last resort (….) 
Much is said about the responsibility to protect; yet we hear 
little about responsibility while protecting. These are concepts 
that we must develop together. For that, the role of the Security 
Council is vital - and the more legitimate its decisions are, the 
better it will be able to play its role.”1
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On November 9th of the same year, the Brazilian Permanent Repre-
sentative at the UN, Ambassador María Luisa Viotti, presented letter 
with a concept note – “Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for 
the Development and Promotion of a Concept”2 during the 12th Secu-
rity Council Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. 
As noted by Sainz-Borgo, it is important to stress that the note was 
addressed to the Secretary General, while Brazil was still occupying 
its seat at the Security Council (SC) (together with the other BRICS 
members), probably with the aim of moving the debate to the General 
Assembly even after Brazil left the SC (Sainz-Borgo, 2012: 194-195).
As summarized by Garwood-Gowers, the document contained two 
main features. First, it outlined several criteria for the Security Council 
to consider when deliberating over the use of force for civilian pro-
tection purposes. These included principles of force as a last resort 
only, proportionality and likelihood of success. The second significant 
feature was a call for the Security Council to establish monitoring 
and compliance mechanisms for assessing the manner in which reso-
lutions are interpreted and implemented. This was a direct response 
to concerns over the way NATO interpreted resolution 1973 in Libya. 
Overall, RwP can be seen as an attempt to build a bridge between the 
West and the Global South, and particularly RtoP rejectionists like 
Russia and China. As a concept RwP was intended to complement, 
rather than replace, RtoP (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 34). 
Rodrigues points out that there were conjuncture and structural 
motivations for the launching of the RwP initiative by Brazil. On 
the conjuncture side he mentions the manipulation of the Libyan 
intervention by the P-3 and the concern about the possible applica-
tion of RtoP in the developing situation in Syria, while the structural 
motivations were related to the difficulties of the implementation of 
the third pillar of RtoP as an international concern and to Brazil´s 
constitutional commitment to human rights as part of its domestic 
agenda (Rodrigues, 2012: 171-173).
In general terms, the note expressed its support for the principle of 
RtoP but also its discontent over its recent use, as mentioned above. 
The note refers to paragraphs 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document3 on the issue but not to the principle’s original formulation 
by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sove-
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reignty (ICISS).4 Criticized for being redundant in some aspects as it 
repeated many of the points of the ICISS report, the RwP note was 
innovative in its sixth paragraph where it calls for the strict political 
and chronological sequencing of RtoP’s three pillars,5 and establishes 
a conceptual distinction between collective responsibility and collec-
tive security. The note, focused on decision-making procedures and 
accountability mechanisms, was in tune with a general concern by the 
international community on the need to deepen the reflection and 
the debate about the building of rules and procedures – particularly 
juridical and political – for the implementation of RtoP (Rodrigues, 
2012: 176-177).
Historically, humanitarian intervention has been a complex issue for 
Brazilian foreign policy makers, and with Brazil´s increasing partici-
pation in global debates, it became a key issue it had to face. Split 
between the non-interventionism and sovereignty principles and the 
need to protect human rights, especially in the face of mass human 
rights violations such as the ones witnessed in Srebrenica, Somalia and 
Rwanda, Brazil had to carefully analyze its path in the global debate 
growing around the issue of civilian protection, moving from the ad-
herence to the principle of “non indifference” promoted in previous 
years to an apparently more concrete and operationalized notion of 
the  “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP).6 In this regard, from 
the perspective of international law, Brazil made an effort to separate 
two trends of International Humanitarian Law in the proposal  – the 
protection of civilians and the use of force in military operations 
(Sainz-Borgo, 2012: 200-201). The concept aimed at reinforcing the 
prioritization of preventive mechanisms, increasing prudence in its 
application, and supporting accountability measures when the Security 
Council decides to use force (Rodrigues and de Souza, 2012).
The main contribution of the RwP note was its attempt to operatio-
nalize the RtoP concept and that it established a set of guidelines to 
orient the Security Council and other involved states in contemplating 
and setting up an RtoP-based intervention:
i) Just as in the medical sciences, prevention is always the best 
policy. It is the emphasis on preventive diplomacy that reduces 
the risk of armed conflict and the human costs associated with it;
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ii) The international community must be rigorous in its efforts 
to exhaust all peaceful means available in the protection of ci-
vilians under threat of violence, in line with the principles and 
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as embodied 
in the 2005 Outcome Document;
iii) The use of force, including in the exercise of the responsibility 
to protect, must always be authorized by the Security Council, 
in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, or, in exceptional circumstances, by the General As-
sembly under its Resolution 377 (V);
iv) The authorization for the use of force must be limited in 
its legal, operational and temporal elements. The scope of 
military action must abide by the letter and the spirit of the 
mandate conferred by the UNSC or the UNGA, and be carried 
out in strict conformity with International Law, in particular 
International Humanitarian Law and the International Law 
of Armed Conflicts;
v) The use of force must produce as little violence and instability 
as possible. Under no circumstances can it generate more harm 
than it was authorized to prevent;
vi) In the event the use of force is contemplated, action must be 
judicious, proportionate and limited to the objectives established 
by the Security Council;
vii) These guidelines must be observed throughout the entire 
length of the authorization, from the adoption of the resolution 
to the suspension of the authorization by a new resolution;
viii) Enhanced UNSC procedures are needed to monitor and 
assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and im-
plemented to ensure responsibility while protecting;
ix) The Security Council must ensure the accountability of those 
to whom authority is granted to resort to force”.7
Within this framework, Brazil´s RwP proposes to complement RtoP 
by focusing on a sequencing of the three pillars:
1) Pillars of RtoP “must follow a strict line of political subor-
dination and chronological sequencing”, 
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2) All peaceful means must be exhausted, therefore a “com-
prehensive and judicious analysis of the possible consequences 
of military action” must take place before considering the use 
of force, 
3) Only the Security Council can authorize the use of force 
in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or “in ex-
ceptional circumstances, by the General Assembly, in line with 
its resolution 377 (V)”, 
4) Such authorizations of the use of force must “be limited 
in its legal, operational and temporal elements”, and the en-
forcement must remain true to “the letter and the spirit” of 
the mandate, 
5)  “enhanced Security Council procedures are needed” in order 
to ensure adequate monitoring and assessment of the inter-
pretation and implementation of the concept; 
6) The Security Council is also obliged to “ensure the accoun-
tability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force”.8
Nevertheless, Pasarelli argues that Brazil´s RwP note was only innova-
tive in its terminology and in its attempt to consolidate a fragmented 
discussion (Pasarelli, 2012). According to the author, the demand for 
criteria for the use of force, a key aspect of RwP, was not new. Overall, 
RwP´s guidelines for implementation of Pillar III were a consolida-
tion of existing principles and criteria under a single expression. A 
first example is that the RwP note stated that the “use of force must 
be preceded by a comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible 
consequences of military action on a case-by-case basis” which has been 
previously highlighted by international, policy-makers and academics 
(Pasarelli, 2012: 80). In stating “l[I]n exercising its collective respon-
sibility, the international community should be careful not to provoke 
more instability than the one it is seeking to limit or to avoid” it evokes 
the notion of “Do no harm” that was already included in the ICISS9 
discussions as well as the concept of proportionality.10 The need for 
UNSC to approve the use of force as stated in the RwP note is already 
clear in the UN Charter, and the concept of accountability is also 
included in the ICISS report.11
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However, Brazil´s note marked a departure from its traditional posture 
on the international debate by advancing a new concept that contested 
the understanding of sovereignty.12 Also, it is a rare example of Brazil 
advancing concrete initiatives that contribute to its aspiration of be-
coming a possibly constructive member of the UN Security Council. 
In any event, it was a first Brazilian attempt to act as a “norm entre-
preneur” or “rule innovator” at the United Nations. 
Without going in further detail on the contents of RwP broadly de-
bated and analyzed by other authors, the sudden reaction of Brazil 
at the moment of ending his stage as non-permanent member of 
the Security Council, and the initial full support by President Dilma 
Rousseff to the initiative at the UN should be seen both as part of an 
initiative addressed to the nation members of the UN in an attempt 
to led the country on the path of a long-time aspiration – becoming a 
legitimized global player and, eventually, contributing to the reform 
of the UN system and obtaining, within its framework, a permanent 
seat at the UNSC, and as a response to an initiative led personally by 
the Minister Antonio Patriota with the support of the President but 
without any apparent broader domestic consultation.13
Following this process, the only organized UN dialogue on RwP thus far 
was an informal discussion at the UN, coordinated by the Permanent 
Mission of Brazil on February 21, 2012. The consensus was that RwP 
was welcomed as a means of enhancing RtoP’s implementation, but 
RtoP’s framework, as set out in the World Summit Outcome Docu-
ment, was not to be renegotiated (Prawse, 2014: 205).
Responsibility while Protecting: The Criticisms
Stuenkel notes that the initial reception of RwP in the West was marked 
by skepticism, while the reaction in the Global South “has been far 
more muted that in the West” (Stuenkel, 2013a). However, even if RwP 
did not receive overwhelming support upon introduction, there has 
been a generally positive response to the proposal over the last couple 
of years. Obviously, Western states have overall been less supportive 
of RwP than non-Western states, who are more wary of intervention 
(Prawse, 2014: 203). 
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The stronger criticisms and rejection came from the Western powers 
and its capitals – Washington, Berlin, Paris and London.
One of the main criticisms was about conceptual differences and 
the lack of conceptual clarity of RwP (Benner, 2013). German UN 
Ambassador Peter Wittig stated that the Brazilian approach lacked “a 
precisely defined concept of its own” as well as criticizing the “prescrip-
tion of a strict chronological sequencing, the mandatory exhaustion of 
all peaceful means, and the introduction of ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
as an additional qualifying trigger” for the use of force. Overall Wittig 
considered that the RwP concept “limits the scope for timely, decisive 
and tailor-made solutions to situations of extreme gravity”.14 On a more 
operational and political perspective, the United States was critical 
of the “higher thresholds for the legitimacy of military intervention, 
such as the requirement that [RtoP’s] three pillars follow a strict line of 
political subordination and chronological sequencing.” Even if the US 
agreed with RwP’s notion that “‘prevention is always the best policy’ and 
[that] preventative diplomacy needs to be strengthened,” Washington 
highlighted two of the elements of RwP with which it disagrees. First, 
the United States argued that it was a mistake to “equate ‘manifest 
failure’ with strict chronological sequence.” There should instead be a 
“comprehensive assessment of risks and costs and the balance of con-
sequences” (Prawde, 2014: 2005) when making decisions, rather than 
just “‘temporal’ considerations.” Second, the United States disagrees 
with the idea that in “circumstances where collective action is necessary, 
diplomacy should be considered ‘exhausted” (Prawde, 2014: 2005).
As argued by Alex Bellamy in his chapter in this volume, conceptual 
criticisms, particularly from Western countries, came additionally 
from RwP emphasis on “sequencing” the use of Pillars I, II and III, in 
a Brazilian effort to respond to the Global South reluctance to accept 
external intervention, arguing that the use of force should be the last 
resort in a situation when the Security Council face the escalade of 
any of the four crimes considered by RtoP vis a vis the incapacity of 
the State to deal with it.
The second criticism from the West was that the RwP note was a sort 
of “tit-for-tat” response to the Libyan RtoP intervention, as it showed 
a late remorse for supporting it.
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But perhaps the most revealing negative reaction by the Western 
powers related to the Brazilian proposal was, as point out by Benner, 
the one that:
“…goes deeper and has to do with how the Euro-Atlantic esta-
blished powers see the process of global norm evolution. Political 
elites and academics alike mostly argue that norm entrepreneur-
ship is (and as some would even add should be) the domain of 
the West. There is little room for agency of non-Western actors 
in the stages of the “norm cycle”. Advocacy for a norm, so the 
argument goes, originates in the West (from governments or 
NGOs). A norm is then codified in an international forum at the 
initiative of Western powers. After that, “global norm diffusion” 
and the implementation of the norm follows. During this pro-
cess, the content of the norm remains unchanged. Non-Western 
countries can only decide whether they want to implement or 
reject the norm (…) In these models, there is little space for 
non-Western norm entrepreneurs who seek to shape a particular 
norm”(Benner, 2013: 6). 
Within this framework, notwithstanding the imperfections and flaws 
of RwP, one of the main reasons for its rejection by the Western powers 
seems to be the fact that Brazil was aspiring to assume a role of norm 
entrepreneur which is usually restricted to the West.
Another source of criticism came with regards to the lack of consul-
tation with its regional neighbors, which Brazilian foreign policy had 
portrayed as being representative of yet did not engage with in an 
open dialogue on the issue of RtoP, humanitarian intervention and 
the development of the RwP note. In part this may be the result of 
Brazil´s differentiated engagement, in which it behaves differently in 
different spheres of the international system, or as Federico Merke puts 
it: “Brazil appears as a conservative state in the region but a reformist 
in the world, especially in regards to the role of international organisms. 
This reformist agenda seems to be channeled through its partners in 
BRICS rather than UNASUR” (Merke, 2014: 8). In this regard, some 
analysts argue that RwP gave Brazil the opportunity of becoming a 
key protagonist as a Latin American voice in the promotion of human 
rights at the international level, as other regional actors were gradually 
displaced from a central role on this issue. While Chile - a historical 
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“champion” of RtoP – lost momentum during the 2005-2010 presi-
dential period, giving less attention to the issue; México – one of the 
other key supporters of RtoP – exited the international arena due to 
domestic priorities,15 and Argentina – a staunch supporter of human 
rights as part of its foreign and domestic policy – was leaning towards 
a Bolivarian prone skepticism, Brazil seized the opportunity to raise 
its profile as an international human  rights promoter and as a new 
international rule innovator (Rodrigues, 2012: 183). In any event, in 
launching the RwP note, Brazil didn´t resort to its apparent regional 
leadership in Latin America as it happened with the creation of UNA-
SUR and CELAC and didn´t build expressly a regional support for its 
initiative. Instead, it seemed to present the note with an eye on playing 
a global role and receiving the support of the BRICS as a Global South 
player which wouldn´t disdain a UN reform that opened the possibility 
for a permanent seat at the Security Council, an aspiration which was 
not necessarily shared by most of the Latin American countries and 
particularly, its closest trade partner and neighbor – Argentina.
Nevertheless, as shown in some of the chapters of this issue, RwP re-
ceived initial support from a broad spectrum of Latin American coun-
tries – from the traditional champions of RtoP such as Argentina and 
Guatemala to radical skeptics such as Bolivarian Venezuela. The ex post 
facto alignment of several Latin American countries seems to respond 
more to an automatic regional solidarity and the identification with the 
Brazilian proposal rather than to a building up of consensus and support 
by Itamaraty. In this regard, on the regional level, it is difficult to assess 
how the initiative resonated in such organizations as MERCOSUR or 
UNASUR, not to mention the case of the already polarized OAS in terms 
of human rights and the reform or even the rejection and denunciation 
of the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS) by members of 
the Bolivarian Alliance (Anaya and Saltalamacchia, 2013).
Also, though including aspects of prevention and accountability, Brazil 
did not engage with civil society in the elaboration of the note, being 
that civil society movements had been a major component in promoting 
and advocating for aspects of accountability and strengthening mass 
atrocity prevention capabilities as key elements in RtoP principle (Ser-
bin and Rodrigues, 2011). In this regard, it should be noted that while 
the Northern NGOs, active in New York and Geneva, reacted quickly 
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to RwP and were involved in the interactive dialogue that followed the 
launching of the initiative, the role of Brazilian and Southern NGOs was 
also clearly a ex post facto involvement (Hamann and Muggah, 2013).
Notwithstanding the generalized sympathy to the initiative, the fellow 
members of the BRICS also reacted to RwP in different ways. Initially, 
China and India “welcomed” RwP, and Russia committed itself to 
“participat[ing] constructively in developing [the] idea” of RwP (Prawse, 
2014: 205). Yet China and Russia were also skeptical, since Brazil´s 
RwP contained an endorsement of the need to intervene in grave cases. 
Fellow emerging powers India and South Africa had little to say on the 
RwP initiative even if the IBSA group signaled stronger interest in the 
concept and seemed open to suggestions that this bloc countries get 
together to further promote and develop the concept (Benner, 2013: 8-9).
It is important to note, that all five BRICS members, as aptly noted by 
Garwood-Gowers (2013) share similar but not identical perspectives on 
RtoP,  as there were significant differences rooted in distinct historical, 
cultural and values experiences, as well as differentiated national inter-
ests. While some of them were open to pillars I and II they also were 
cautious about coercive pillar III measures. The cautious approach or 
the open reluctance over pillar III implementation reflected a deeper 
contestation over RtoP’s content, scope and implications for interna-
tional order, and the lack of a monolithic consensus in the internatio-
nal community, particularly among the Global South, with regards to 
external intervention and the use of force. This contestation reflected 
both pragmatic and normative concerns over pillar III, mostly related 
to the risk of abuse by powerful Western states, the emphasis on the 
role that regional organizations could play, the scepticism about the 
efficacy of military force, and the preference for non-coercive civilian 
protection measures, including dialogue. Overall, this contestation was 
associated with a pluralist resistance to an assertive, liberal vision of 
RtoP. 
After Brazil´s RwP note, China followed suit with the presentation 
of a document on “Responsible Protection” (RP), which was part of 
the display of criticisms and contestation from the Global South to 
the norm,16 but it was clear that there was no monolithic response of 
support by the BRICS bloc. However, the different nuances expressed 
in their criticisms or the full rejection by the members of the bloc of the 
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RtoP norm, and particularly pillar III, after Libya, reflect the disparity 
of positions and national interests by the members of the BRICS, but 
also marked an important step in the terms of the contestation of a 
global norm mostly promoted by the Western countries, as a relevant 
dimension of the reconfiguration of power relations in the international 
system. Within this context, Brazil’s RwP and China’s RP initiatives 
represented more restrictive interpretations of pillar III. 
However, the BRICS’ positions on Syria must be assessed in two se-
parate phases. The first– from April to November 2011 – saw all five 
members assume a unified stance in opposition to proposed Western 
responses to the crisis. In the second phase – from December 2011 
onwards – the IBSA states shifted their positions, gradually becoming 
more receptive to proposed civilian protection measures. Instead of 
continuing to act as a bloc the BRICS split into two sub-groups: on 
one side, Russia and China remained strongly aligned in its opposition 
to any coercive measures against Syria, while on the other, the IBSA 
states adopted more flexible, though not always identical, stances 
towards proposed international action (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 24).
Divergences between the Russian and China position with that of IBSA 
states can be explained by numerous factors. First, national interest of 
BRICS do not coincide being that Russia’s sustains a strong opposition 
to intervention due to strategic interests in Syria and China´s strategy 
is based on alignment with Russia in the Security Council, especially 
after the Libyan intervention while IBSA countries have less at stake 
in the case of collapse of the Syrian regime. A second factor has been 
the differing internal governance structures of the BRICS as IBSA 
states have a democratic nature and the Syrian crisis had increased 
domestic media and civil society pressure for international action, while 
these internal pressures are non-existent or less relevant in China and 
Russia. Thirdly, IBSA states are seeking to gain permanent seats in the 
Security Council and therefore need to establish credentials, assume 
more relevant roles in international affairs,  and obtain the support 
of Western countries while for China and Russia these factors do not 
influence their position and they can afford to pose a strong opposition 
to Western initiatives. Overall, these factors help to explain why the 
IBSA states have gradually moved away from the Russian and Chinese 
positions on Syria (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 32-33).
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RwP: Officially pronounced dead?
After the discussion organized by the Permanent Mission of Brazil on 
RwP in February 2012 had generated an unusual amount of interest 
and debate on a global scale, the general expectation was that Brazil 
would continue to prioritize RwP in its multilateral agenda. The 
concept had gained substantial backing from several traditional RtoP 
supporters and was being debated in multiple capitals. However, as 
observed by Stuenkel, February 21st 2012 turned out to be the apex of 
Brazil´s activism (Stuenkel, 2013b).
Before that date, RwP had benefitted significantly from Antonio 
Patriota’s personal support related to his personal interest in issues 
of sovereignty and intervention, and the former Foreign Minister not 
only contributed to the drafting and presentation of the RWP note 
but frequently spoke about the concept both in Brazil and abroad. In 
the months following RwP’s presentation, the concept gained currency 
in UN circles, setting the agenda on a major international peace and 
security challenge. In many ways, RwP symbolized the very strategy 
Brazilian foreign policy-makers aspired to pursue: it acted as a bridge-
builder, mediator and consensus-seeker through thought leadership 
(Stuenkel and Tourinho, 2014: 18-19).
Yet after February 2012, the concept lost momentum within UN circles 
and diplomats. While RwP continued to be mentioned during debates, 
there was no longer the sense that Brazil prioritized the matter. As 
some analysts pointed out, Brasilia “refrained from issuing an official 
follow-up note to deal with some of the most convincing critics. In some 
ways, this was problematic: Brazil had distanced itself from the rigid 
sequencing approach that appeared in the original concept note, but 
many commentators continued to read the only document available and 
believed that Brazil’s official position has not changed. It appeared that 
the Brazilian Government had decided not to turn RwP into the foreign 
policy signature issue of Dilma Rousseff ’s first term. The Brazilian 
President mentioned, but declined to explain the issue better during her 
opening speech of the UN General Assembly in September 2012 (…) In 
the same way, the Brazilian President did not mention the RwP concept 
during her opening speech at the UN General Assembly in September 
2013” (Stuenkel and Tourinho, 2014: 19).
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There are several interpretations to explain Brazil´s retreat from the 
RwP initiative. One of them relates this retreat to internal divergences 
within the Brazilian government, as the initiative was launched without 
extensive consultation with different domestic sectors and was mostly 
promoted by Patriota himself, who persuaded President Rousseff to 
further advance the initiative. Consequently, once he left the post 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs, even if moving to the UN Mission, his 
position was weakened. The exit of Patriota as Foreign Minister and 
his replacement with a colleague with a lesser predilection for security 
issues, coupled with President Rousseff’s notorious disinterest in foreign 
policy, especially in an election year, appears to have doomed the RwP 
initiative (Kenkel, 2014: 22-23). The second one relates to the resistance 
and the criticisms that the initiative confronted once presented, and 
the lack of preparation of Brazilian diplomats to deal with them. As 
pointed out by Benner “Brazil seems to have been unprepared for the 
criticism and pushback after it launched the RwP concept. (…)  Engaging 
in the business of norm entrepreneurship means taking risks and dealing 
with setbacks and criticisms -  especially in a charged and contested 
political environment such as the debate on intervention and the use of 
force”(Benner, 2013: 8-9). Another plausible interpretation – related 
to the previous one – is Brazil´s foreign policy cautious approach to 
controversial international issues and the associated risk aversion of its 
decision-makers. In an eventual balance of costs and benefits of trying 
to become a global player fostering the debate on a global norm – which 
touched such a sensitive issues as intervention and use of force–, the 
reaction by Western powers and the lack of a united support from the 
Global South may have become a deterrent for the Brazilian initiative. 
Yet, even if the RwP concept was an important discussion starter and a 
catalyst, raising some of the concerns of the Global South regarding in-
tervention and the use of force and opening the debate with the Western 
powers, at the time when the discussion should have started to tackle 
the serious open questions, Brazil seemed to retreat from the initiative. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding Brazil´s retreat from a continued sup-
port and promotion of the initiative, some aspects of the RwP proposal 
remain relevant. Stuenkel and Tourinho point to three aspects that “are 
worth highlighting. First, the proposal was the first concrete articulation 
in at least a decade about the further specification and regulation of the 
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use of military force under Chapter VII by the Security Council. On this 
issue the proposal goes beyond situations in which RtoP is invoked, and 
while the Council is certainly sovereign in its decisions, tighter normative 
oversight may be in order to increase global consensus about its Chapter 
VII activities. Second, as the UN membership continues to debate reform 
of the working methods and procedures of the Security Council, RwP 
gives some concrete suggestions on the need for greater transparency 
and accountability in the workings of the Security Council. Third, the 
question of internal hierarchy and lack of sufficient information within 
the Council (between the permanent and elected members) is implicit 
in RwP’s claims for greater transparency and information, and for the 
ultimate authority to remain with the Council as an institution (and 
not just of some of its members)”. Adding that, “In this sense, while 
RwP is an important stand-alone diplomatic initiative to adjust current 
international practices on RtoP, it is also part of a broader and more 
long-standing debate about the use of force as authorized by the UN 
Security Council. Brazil might have refrained from pushing for its broad 
acceptance, but if the UN Security Council is to remain legitimate as 
the centrepiece of global order in relation to issues of international peace 
and security, at least some elements of the proposal will ultimately have 
to be revisited” (Stuenkel and Tourinho, 2014: 19-20).
As noted by Kenkel, despite the efforts of civil society and the academy 
to revitalize the process, it appears that proponents of prominent parti-
cipation by states from the global South in the RtoP conversation will 
need to look beyond the “Responsibility while Protecting”. Nevertheless, 
during its short journey, the RwP paper went a surprisingly long way 
towards laying bare the basic tenets of discord over RtoP’s implemen-
tation, as well as providing the spaces necessary for future debate. It is 
to be hoped that in the future the domestic and international contexts 
will intertwine to allow Brazil to play its crucial role as a global media-
tor on issues of RtoP and intervention (Kenkel, 2014). However, RwP 
is unlikely to have a lasting impact on the debate on RtoP without a 
powerful and credible sponsor like Brazil (Stuenkel, 2013b). As a result, 
what was once a promising bridgehead between North and South has 
perhaps met with a premature end (Kenkel, 2015: 9).
Nevertheless, to end on a positive note, with all its drawbacks the RwP 
initiative illustrate the potential for a growing aspiration of an emerging 
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Global South power to assert its own normative preferences in the 
global agenda, as an emerging norm entrepreneur or rule innovator. 
This aspiration increasingly demands from the Western powers to 
accept, adapt and accommodate to a set of non-Western approaches 
and perspectives on sovereignty, intervention and global governance, 
within a changing international order. However, in the case of Latin 
America it shows once again, that even having developed, as a region, a 
substantial background and political capital as rule innovator, without a 
consistent leadership and a unified regional approach changing existing 
global norms can become a difficult task. 
NOTES
1. Statement by H.E. Dilma Rousseff (2011). President of the Federa-
tive Republic of Brazil, at the Opening of the General debate of the 
66th. Session of the United Nations General assembly, New York, 21 
September 2011, http://www.un.in/brazil/speech/11d-Pr-Dilma-Rossef-
opening- of-the-66th-general-assembly.html
2. Letter dated November 9th 2011 from the Permanent Representative 
of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, 
general assembly, Sixty-sixth  Session agenda items 14 and 117, http://
www.globalr2p.org/media/pdf/Concept-Paper_RwP.pdf
3. United Nations General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, 
United Nations Document A/60/1, 16 September 2005, paragraphs 
138-139.
4. Permanent Mission of the Federative Republic of Brazil to the United 
Nations. “Responsibility while protecting: elements for the develop-
ment and promotion of a concept”, 9 November 2011, United Nations 
Document A/66/551-S/2011/701, accessed 23 July 2015,  http://cpdoc.
fgv.br/sites/default/files/2011%2011%2011%20UN%20conceptual%20
paper%20on%20RwP.pdf, paragraph 3.  
5. Ibidem, paragraph 6.
6. As noted by Wojcikiewicz Almeida “… the ambiguity of the concept 
of non-indifference, the difficulty of translating it into tangible actions 
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capable of guiding foreign policy, and the desire for a more active role 
in decision-making processes under the UN, together led Brazil to 
create what appears to be a new label for an already well-established 
idea (…) This ‘new’ notion is ‘Responsibility with Protection’ (RwP) 
(Wojcikiewicz Almeida, 2013:10).
7. Permanent Mission of the Federative Republic of Brazil to the United 
Nations. “Responsibility while protecting: elements for the develop-
ment and promotion of a concept”, 9 November 2011, United Nations 
Document A/66/551-S/2011/701, accessed 23 July 2015,  http://cpdoc.
fgv.br/sites/default/files/2011%2011%2011%20UN%20conceptual%20
paper%20on%20RwP.pdf
8. Ibidem.
9. ICISS, 7.26
10. ICISS, 7.27
11. ICISS, 7.29
12. As noted by Benner “The RWP initiative is a major departure in 
Brazilian foreign policy in two respects. First, it is one of the rare 
cases where Brazil has forcefully advanced a new concept related to a 
contested key aspect of the global order – the understanding of sove-
reignty (…) Second, until 2011 Brazil had mostly pursued a skeptical 
if not outright negative course vis-à-vis the concept of a RtoP. The 
RWP concept, however, marks a clear departure from this position 
because it acknowledges the responsibility to intervene, in certain 
circumstances militarily”, in Benner 2013: 2.
13. RwP had benefitted significantly from Antonio Patriota’s personal 
support, and the former Foreign Minister frequently spoke about 
the concept both in Brazil and abroad. In September 2012 President 
Dilma Rousseff referred to RwP as a necessary complement to R2P 
(Stuenkel and Tourinho, 2014: 15).However, as noted by Rodrigues 
(2012: 174) “la formulación de la RwP ha seguido el patrón clásico de 
la diplomacia brasileña: ha sido elaborada a partir del estado brasileño 
y centrada en Itamaraty, sin ningún proceso de consulta específico con 
la sociedad civil del país o de la región”.
14. Informal discussion on “Responsibility While Protecting” Hosted 
by the Permanent Mission of Brazil, New York, 21 February 2012, 
Remarks of Ambassador Dr. Peter Wittig, Permanent Representative 
of Germany to the UN, www.globalr2p.org/resources/RwP.php
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15. Arturo Sotomayor argues, interestingly enough, that “Mexico’s position 
vis-à-vis the RtoP debate can be described as “domestically instru-
mental”; it instrumentally and conveniently used the international 
framework to induce domestic change and justify national policies”, 
adding that “Mexico is effectively split into two irreconcilable domes-
tic agendas that impede and constraint any norm entrepeneurial role 
overseas. On the one hand, Mexico has been traditionally supportive of 
human rights initiatives and has used RtoP concepts to frame domestic 
debates (…) domestically, Mexico’s RtoP/human rights agenda is more 
strictly controlled by diplomatic bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry. 
On the other hand, its security agenda is dominated by military 
(specifically Army) interests, which have been traditionally opposed 
to RtoP proposals on intervention (…) these two domestic positions 
have not been reconciled in a coherent and consistent way. As a result, 
Mexico’s foreign policy, especially as it pertains to the RtoP debate, 
is inherently contradictory, disjointed, and confused. The Mexican 
strategy has thus consisted of picking and chosing between different 
notions entailed in RtoP debates, often favoring a human rights and 
preventive issues at the expense of the broader debate on intervention. 
The strategy might have worked in the early 2000s, when democratiza-
tion dictated an emphasis on human rights. But increasingly, Mexico’s 
RtoP policy is undermined by its own national security agenda. Until 
Mexico resolves its domestic contradictions, it will not be able to play 
a norm entrpeneurial role at the UN or in RtoP circles” (Sotomayor, 
2014: 2;20).
16. As noted by Laskaris and Kreutz (2015: 154) “In October 2013, during 
a closed conference organized by the China Institute of International 
Studies, China’s foreign minister presented the “Responsible Protec-
tion” to a group of experts mainly coming from BRICS states (Zongze, 
2012). According to this, six principles are to be adhered to: the object 
of an intervention should be clear and people of the target country 
should be protected by all means; the legitimacy of the protection must 
be established; the means of protection must be limited; the purpose 
of protection must be clear; the “protectors” should be responsible for 
the post-intervention and post-protection reconstruction of the state 
concerned; and the UN should establish mechanisms of supervision, 
outcome evaluation and post factum accountability to ensure the 
means, process, scope and results of protection.
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